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6INTRODUCTION
Within a generation the debilitating effect of
two serious depressions suggest that the investor can no
longer make a purchase or entertain the notion of a purchase
without a careful investigation of the field of stocks in
which he wishes to invest. The concept of investments which
are safe and need no review is happily disappearing. Care-
ful standards of selection of stock and reasonable, periodi-
cal inspection are necessary and should be sufficient to
prevent serious losses.
Therefore, this thesis is concerned with the con-
templated or retention investment. With this thought in
mind it is necessary to make a careful examination of simi-
lar companies within an industrial field, their records,
their general future, the quality of production, and earn-
ings and leadership between them and the leading companies,
and from these facts present sound conclusions in a logical
manner so that a determination can be made of whether the
issues should be "bought, sold, retained or exchanged for
some other." (1)
The New England shoe industry presents an inter-
esting study for the investor. The economics of the indus-
try are a vital factor in the economics of the New England
1--Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. Security Analysis,
p. 18
..
t
.
7region. All of the shoe concerns investigated have long,
established reputations for output, quality and stability.
Furthermore, they were selected because they are the larger
of the many companies in the New England section and because
they have characteristics that make the problem of compari-
son with the national leaders more cogent. Therefore, the
essential problem to the analyst is: Do these concerns pre-
sent worthwhile investments?
Very recently a study by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston was made in regard to the New England shoe indus-
try. So much data, which were not procurable elsewhere,
were available from this source that the author has drawn
heavily upon this study.
The National Shoe Manufacturers Association has
also made available a great many facts which when assembled
in their proper perspective gave a very revealing glimpse of
the condition of the shoe industry as a whole and to a
limited degree that of New England.
Much of the financial information was obtained
from the financial services--Standard & Poor, Moody’ s--
and stockholders’ reports of the companies involved in this
investigation.
V. ;; il ( •
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8I. THE HISTORY OF THE NEW ENGLAND SHOE INDUSTRY
The history of the New England shoe industry began
the day the Mayflower sailed into Salem, Massachusetts on
its second trip to the new laid. (1) On a contract of em-
ployment with the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Thomas Beard, a
shoemaker of St. Martin’ s, London had come to Salem in 1629
to teach his trade to the settlers and to make shoes for
their needs.
The shoes made by Beard and other craftsmen who
came later were crude, low-cut, uncomfortable, silver-
buckled affairs. (2) They had no rights or lefts and
could be interchanged.
When the trade had become sufficiently well-known,
colonists made their own shoes in small shops set off from
the kitchen. Members of the family assisted in the differ-
ent chores, the women binding the uppers and the men cutting
the leather and attaching the soles. (3)
After roads and settlements had been established,
itinerant cobblers wandered from village to village making
shoes for the entire family*. They carried their tools and
leather supplies in their packs. Most of them earned their
keep by sharpening axes and knives, pulling teeth, and.
1
—
International Shoe Company. The Story of Footwear,
p. 14
2—
-Karold R. Quimby. The Story of Footwear, p. 14
3 Ibid, p. 18
.'
*
*
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9 .
passing on gossip from the preceding hamlet in addition to
shoemaking and repairing*
The supply of material needed for shoe building
came from the tanneries of the colonies* Tannery processes
were elementary and rough. Hides were soaked and rinsed,
and treated with lime to remove hair* They were then laid
on bark and kept there for an indefinite period* When the
hides were removed, the heavier and thicker skins were used
for soles and the thinner, for uppers.
By 1751 the wandering shoemakers had settled down
into little shops. The population had increased; conse-
quently, there was a need for bigger working organizations
to supply the increased demand.
These early shoe shops usually contained a master
shoemaker, two journeymen, and an apprentice who received a
long training in exchange for his services.
Whatever industry there was seemed to be concen-
trated in the Massachusetts and New England area with the
cities of Peabody, Lynn and Haverhill dominating the early
colonial period.
By 1750 John Adams Dagyr, a Welshman, had intro-
duced a new concept to the shoe industry. In Lynn, Massa-
chusetts he set up the first factory for the production of
footwear. (1) His system divided the total construction
1--Gill Publications. Three Hundred Years of Shoe and
Leather Making, p. 7-12
.»
t
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10
into separate and distinct operations, each of which was
performed by one worker* His methods were so superior to
those prevailing that they were immediately adopted among
shoemakers. In fact, Dagyr is generally recognized as
having rescued the American shoe industry from English com-
petition. (1)
Upto the middle of the 18th century, shoes were
made only by order. When Dagyr introduced his division of
labor, manufacturers began to overproduce. Shoes were made
for stock. Not only did this keep the workers busy when
orders declined, but it allowed the manufacturer to use the
shoes for barter purposes. Later these stock shoes were
brought to Boston and sold to the general public.
At first, this system of distribution was not too
successful. The people were unaccustomed to buying shoes
that were not custom made. But gradually this method of
sale became an accepted fact in the bigger cities with the
result that "sale shoes" began to displace custom boot-
making. (2)
Shoemaking tools continued to be very simple hand
tools. Soles were attached to uppers by wooden pegs of
hard maple. Shoe design was based on sturdiness and long-
wearing qualities, rather than style or comfort.
However, the Colonial shoe industry began to meet
1—
Ibid
2
—
Harold R. Quimby. The Story of Footwear, p. 19
.
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competition from England and France, These countries, with
their more elegant and better processed shoes, sent over
huge amounts of their products. This caused a slump in
domestic production. To protect the growing industry. Con-
gress passed a tariff law in 1789. And from that time on,
domestic footwear has always been protected by duties on
foreign shoes.
With the extension of waterways and the rapid
growth of metropolitan areas, production had increased to
nearly a million shoes by 1810, (1) New inventions saved
working time and helped manufacturers produce better con-
structed shoes. In 1812 shoe nails were used in place of
wooden pegs to fasten soles to uppers. Buttons and shoe-
laces were also used to secure the shoe to the foot. Such
inventions as the Kimball-Last made possible separate lasts
for the right and left feet. (2) The Gilman lathe improved
last making by permitting lasts to be graded in sizes.
Patent leather and diagram patterns for shoe cutting were
introduced; shoe counters were manufactured for stock when
previously they had been fitted to the lasts; shoe boxes were
first used in 1840 and the edge iron for finishing shoe edges
was an early tool improvement.
But the year 1846 was an important year for the
1
—
Gill Publications. Three Hundred Years of Shoe and
Leather Making, p. 7-12
2-
-Intemational Shoe Company. The Story of Footwear, p. 20
4. ,
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shoe industry. It was in that year that Elias Howe, Jr.,
invented his sewing maching which eliminated laborious hand
stitching. "He changed the process of sewing by putting the
eye of the needle in the point..." (1)
Shoemaking began to spread out of the New England
states to other areas, such as New York state and the Ohio
*
River Valley. More developments in machines took place.
Hide splitting and sole cutting machines were invented, and
horsepower was applied to machinery.
In spite of all the developments in both tools and
technique, no satisfactory method of sewing soles to shoes
existed until 1858, when Lyman Blake invented a device that
did precisely that thing. His achievement was a landmark in
shoe construction— it changed a method of shoemaking that
had remained basically unchanged since 1400 B.C.
Unfortunately, Blake was only an inventor and not
a publicist. He found it difficult to interest shoemakers
in his mechanical stitcher. However, Colonel Gordon McKay,
a promoter and organizer, bought the machine from Blake for
$50, 000. McKay spent hundreds of thousands of dollars per-
fecting the machine but still could not dispose of it.
Manufacturers were loathe to upset the long tradition of
shoemaking and, what is more important, could not invest the
large amount of capital needed to buy the apparatus. In
1
—Harold R. Quimby. The Story of Footwear, p. 26
t . . c !
'
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fact, McKay became desperate enough to offer the machine to
a syndicate for $250,000. (1) Fortunately for him, the
syndicate turned him down.
The Civil War was McKay’s salvation. Shoe manu-
facturers received huge orders for army shoes. To cope with
the increased demand and the limited amount of workers,
manufacturers agreed to try out McKay’s machine on a royalty
basis. The leasing system was successful and spread rapidly
throughout the industry.
Once McKay had introduced his machinery, competing
equipment was brought on the market. Charles Goodyear
helped promote the welting machine which bears his name.
The welt preserved the shape of the shoe and made it much
finer in quality. (2) Goodyear, backed by James Hanan, a
N ew York shoe manufacturer, formed the Goodyear Welt Shoe
Machinery Company.
J. Ernest Matzeliger, of Dutch Guiana, also en-
tered the machinery field when he built his "Niggerhead
Laster, ” a machine that pulled the upper part of the shoe
over the last and held it in place while the rest of the
shoe was attached. Matzeliger’ s company was called the
Consolidated Lasting Company which formed, somewhat later,
the parent company of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation.
Meanwhile, McKay had also developed the technique
1
—
International Shoe Company. The Story of Footwear, p. 21
2-
-Fortune Editors. Understanding the Big Corporations, pw 119
t
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of having a crew of highly skilled mechanics servicing all
his machines in case of breakdown- -both to inspire confi-
dence in his machinery and to keep his royalties, based as
they were on production, from stopping*
This system worked very well* It permitted new
manufacturers to enter the field with little capital for
machinery and assured them of the best equipment without
any cost for depreciation, mechanical breakdown or obsoles-
cence*
Naturally the other two companies, Goodyear and
Consolidated, employed the same approach. Competition was
sharp. Therefore, Sidney Wilmot Winslow, who controlled
Consolidated, suggested a merger of the three companies.
Goodyear Welt, controlled by Hanan, merged with Consoli-
dated. Later Colonel McKay merged with the other two* The
final merger took place in 1899, and with that consolida-
tion United Shoe Machinery Corporation became the colossus
of shoe manufacture.
By 1911 United had managed to secure almost all
of the shoe machinery business. So large had it become,
and so powerful, that the United States government institu-
ted a trust suit against the company. The government lost
on the grounds that the companies forming United were not
competitive, each having had separate patents and machinery
before the merger. But in 1915 the Attorney-General of the
United States tried again under the Clayton Act and was par-
.-
.
,
.
,
.
.
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tially succcessful when he forced United to lease its machin
ery by machine units instead of groups, (1)
However, the company continued to build up its
strength in the field by swallowing up any independent
patents on shoe machinery and by excellent service to its
clients. Every user of United machinery had a serviceman
within easy call. In fact, some of the larger concerns had
United men stationed permanently on the premises. Further-
more, United managed to lower the cost of its machinery to
the point where the manufacturer could pay for the leasing
even though the cost of development was greater to United
than the return from royalties--for the first few years of
operation. Actually, however, the longer the machine is run
and the more standardized it becomes, "the closer the roy-
alty income approaches the status of net income.'1 (2)
On the credit side. United has maintained its
position because it developed modem shoe machinery at a
reasonable cost to its clients and made this machinery
available to anyone who could pay the royalties.
Before the formation of United Shoe Machinery
Corporation, the shoe industry itself had become national-
ized. Upto 1860 the history of the shoe industry could not
be distinguished from the evolution of New England shoe-
making. With the impetus provided by the Civil War, other
1
—
Fortune Editors. Understanding the Big Corporations, p. 121
2—
Ibid, p. 134
«.
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areas began to contribute to the boot and shoemaking trade*
Plants operated in Rochester, Buffalo, New York, Cincinnati,
Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, St. Louis and as far west as
San Francisco* Between 1900 and 1946 new discoveries were
made for the treatment of leather, regional shoe associations
sprang up, stitching and heeling machinery was improved, the
Compo method of cementing shoes together was developed as
competition for the many processes controlled by United Shoe
Machinery, consumer consumption of shoes was increasing,
playshoes were introduced to the public, and shoe sales
reached an all-time high by 1946.
Finally, shoe manufacturing took on several dis-
tinct systems of making shoes. Some of the methods are;
the Welt shoe in which two seams, the inseam and the outseam
unite all the main components of the shoe; the Cement shoe
which cements the entire shoe together without the use of
stitching; the McKay shoe which utilizes a stitch passing
through the outer and inner soles; the Turn shoe which is
made inside out and then turned for the finish; the Stitch-
down shoe which turns out the edge of the upper for stitch-
ing to the sole. Other processes, such as the Silhouwelt,
the Littleway, Screw and California are not in as great a
use as those mentioned above. (1)
l--Harold R. Quimby. The Story of Footwear, p. 43-45
„.
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TABLE I: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SHOE INDUSTRY
1626—Peter Minuit of Manhattan devised a horse-drawn
machine for the tanning of hides*1629-
-Thomas Beard laided at Salem,
1630
—
Francis Ingalls, of Lincolnshire, England, the first
tanner in the land, settled in Lynn, Massachusetts.
1638--The Eversteen Brothers built the first tannery in
New York.
1648—The Massachusetts Bay Colony granted a charter of
incorporation to the "Shoemakers of Boston."
1688--The legislature of Massachusetts passed laws
separating tanning from currying and shoemaking.
1730--Pointed toes for women became the style.
1750--John Adams Dagyr set up his factory in Lynn.
1772-
-Wooden pegs for attaching soles to uppers were coming
into vogue.
1789--Congress passed a tariff law protecting the domestic
industry of the new nation.
1792 Shoe laces were used in place of buckles to fasten
shoes to the feet.
1793—
-The custom bootmaking period was now superseded by
shoes for sale.
1794 The first retail shoe store was opened in Boston.
1796—The first labor strike occurred in Philadelphia when
shoemakers asked for and received an increase in wage
1809—The first leather splitting machine was invented in
Newburyport, Massachusetts.
1812— Shoe nails supplanted wooden pegs (introduced by
Elisha Hobart of South Abington, Massachusetts).
1815—The Blanchard lathe for making lasts was developed in
Sutton, Massachusetts.
-—
,
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TABLE I: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SHOE INDUSTRY (CONT'D)
1822—The first lasts making rights and lefts were invented
in Philadelphia,
In that year patent leather was also introduced as a
shoe covering,
1827—Chrome ore was utilized in tanning,
1832—Diagram patterns for cutting shoes were used for the
first time in New England,
1835—An obscure tanner from Woburn was the first to use
steam power in a tannery,
1842
—The Candee Rubber Company of New Haven, Connecticut
was the first to use Charles Goodyear’ s rubber pro-
cess for the manufacture of rubber shoes,
1845
—The manufacture of boot and shoe counters indepen-
dently of the finished product had its beginning in
Stoughton, Massachusetts, John Gilmore invented his
sole-leather hardening machine,
1850-
-A machine for fleshing and unhairing hides was inven-
ted,
1855—Horsepower was applied to shoe manufacturing for the
first time in a Marlboro, Massachusetts factory,
1858
—Lyman Blake of Abington, Massachusetts Invented his
machine for sewing soles to uppers.
The boot and shoe industry was the largest business
in the United States.
1861—McKay introduced his leasing system to the shoe
industry,
1865—Rights and lefts were made in volume for the soldiers
of the Civil War,
1874— Goodyear developed his welting machine,
1876—
William L, Douglas started the first chain store
retail outlet for his manufactured products,
1877-
-Edging and heel trimming machines were developed.
». r t
“
.
-
,
~
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TABLE I: HIGHLIGHTS OP THE SHOE INDUSTRY (CONT’D)
1880—Half sizes in shoes became popular among manufactu-
rers.
1883—Jan Ernest Matzeliger invented his lasting machine.
1886—A combined shoemaker’ s pincers and hammer machine was
produced.
1892--A curved needle machine sewed welts to a shoe while
it was on the last.
1895
—Thomas G. Plant of Boston developed his Wonder Worker
machines which both sewed and heeled.
1899-
-The United Shoe Machinery Corporation was formed.
1900
—
-Lasting and pull-over processes were developed.
1904—Better heeling methods were also developed.
1907 to the present—Folding, eye-letting, clicking and
lasting operations, stock fitting patterns, sewing
and stitching developments, cement sole stitching,
the introduction of the playshoe and even the use of
television for advertising all played their part in
the history and evolution of the national and New
England shoe industry.
Source: Harold R. Quirnby. The Story of Footwear, p. 17,
22, 23, 27-40, 46-52.
„1
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II. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OP THE NEW ENGLAND SHOE
INDUSTRY
Although New England has consistently dominated
the shoe manufacturing field since its beginning in 1629,
this leadership began to decline by the end of the Civil
War* (1) New manufacturers were entering the field* Com-
petition was now possible since centers of population were
shifting out of the eastern seaboard* Furthermore, the
mechanization of manufacturing had proceeded at a rapid
rate; factory labor was more plentiful, and regional mar-
kets had begun to develop* Another prime factor aiding the
development of the national shoe industry was the nearness
of non-New England producers to their supply of raw mate-
rials*
By the end of World War I the significance of
other production had so seriously cut New England* s lead
that it only contributed 48$ of the national output* (2)
Government orders for military shoes during the war stimu-
lated the further industrial development in other areas*
National development made further inroads on New
England production between 1919 and 1924. Production fig-
ures dipped to a new low of only 34$ of total United States
1-
-Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p* 2
2—
Ibid
..
*
'
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_
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output. However, from that time on until 1947 production
usually "fluctuated closely with national output," (1)
Just before World War II another shift in New
England production took place; Massachusetts had begun to
lose ground within its own sphere to New Hampshire and
Maine, (2)
In spite of its tenuous leadership nationally,
the shoe industry in New England occupies a relatively
strong position among regional manufactures. It is the
fourth largest industrial employer in the region, (3) In
fact, in some cities, shoe plants absorb over 70^ of the
industrial working potential. Subsidiary fields such as
the last, pattern, lining, trimmings, eyelet, shoe nails
and tack industries, provide additional employment (about
one-fourth of those employed directly in the shoe industry)
•
(4) In January 1949, 80,000 workers were engaged directly
in the shoe industry; 20,000, in allied trades, (5) More-
over, high employment in the shoe industry means greater
purchasing power for the New England communities; the rea-
son— the region is a converting area, importing all its raw
materials, processing them and shipping them out for na-
tional consumption. Its profits then are based on the resi -
1-
Ibid
2-
-Ibid
3-
-Maxwell Field, Executive Vice-President, New England Shoe
and Leather Association. Boston Herald, January 30, 1949.
4-
-Boston Chamber of Commerce. The Shoe Manufacturing
Industry of New England, p. 8-9
5-
-Maxwell Field. Boston Herald, January 30, 1949.
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TABLE II: INDUSTRIAL STAGES OF SHOECRAFT IN AMERICA
1629-1650 1651-1750
Market developed
by
Itinerant worker Personal activities
of shoe worker and
family
Shoes produced by Hand* Itinerant
shoe workers
traveled from
home to home.
Hand, Small kitch-
en shops with shoe
worker and members
of own family
Tools used Hand tools--awl,
hammer, needles,
thread, pegs,
knives
Hand tools— same
as preceding
period
How employees
were paid
Board, lodging
and wages
Master shoe worker
made own finished
shoe prices
Shoes made princi-
pally for and sold
direct to
individuals Individuals
Manufacturing
developments
Shoes made over
hand hewn lasts by
use of simple hand
tools. The first
American guild, the
"Shoemakers of
Boston" was granted
a charter of incor-
poration by the
Colony of Massachu-
setts Bay on Octo-
ber 18, 1648
Shoes were hand
made, Shoemak ing
tools were simple.
Design confined to
simple patterns.
Style develop-
ments
Colonial buckle
period. Low heels
on men’ s, women'
s
and children'
s
shoes
Early American
colonists learned
to make moccasins
which were export-
ed to England dur-
ing the middle of
the 17th Century
Movement of
manufacturing
New England New England and
Atlantic Coast to
Virginia
--
--
.
.
-
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TABLE II: INDUSTRIAL STAGES OF SHOECRAFT IN AMERICA (CONT'D)
1751-1800 1801-1850
Market developed
by
Expansion of local
trading area
Extension of water-
ways
Shoes produced by Hand* Small home
shops with master
shoe worker and
journeyman
Hand* Small home
shops with master
shoe worker and
journeyman
Tools used Hand tools--same
as those used in
the preceding
periods
Hand tools— same
as those used in
the preceding
periods
How employees
were paid
Wages Wages
Shoes made princi-
pally for and sold
direct to
Auction market Wholesalers
Manufacturing
developments
John Adams Dagyr,
father of American
shoemaking, opera-
ted first success-
ful factory in
1750* Most shoes,
however, were made
in kitchen shops
Most shoes were
hand pegged, hand
nailed or hand
sewed prior to and
during this period*
Sewing machine was
invented in 1846 by
Elias Howe, Jr*
Style develop-
ments
Brogue type of
shoe invented in
Ireland about 1790
Blucher type of
shoe created by
Gen* Blucher in
1810, D» Orsay pump
invented by Count
D f Orsay in 1838
«
Gore shoe invented
by J, Sparkes Hall
in 1836
Movement of
manufacturing
Eastern seaboard
in addition to New
England and Atlan-
tic Coast to Vir-
ginia* First re-
tail shoe store
opened in Boston
in 1794
Eastern seaboard in
addition to New Eng-
land and Atlantic
Coast to Virginia
'.
-
•
'
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TABLE II: INDUSTRIAL STAGES OF SHOECRAFT IN AMERICA (CONT'D)
1851-1875 1876-1900
Market developed
by
Extension of high-
ways
Extension of rail-
roads
Shoes produced by Hand tools and
machines* Con-
tractor workshops*
Workers operated
in teams
Machines* Manufac-
turer workshops
Tools used Hand tools and
foot power
Foot power machines
How employees
were paid
(Team work rates Team work rates
Shoes made princi-
pally for and sold
direct to
Wholesalers Wholesalers and
retailers
Manufacturing
developments
McKay shoes were
first made in Lynn,
Mass., in 1861*
Welt sewing machine
was developed and
perfected under the
direction of
Charles Goodyear,
Jr.
Half- sizes in shoes
were introduced in
1880. Standard last
measurements were
determined in 1887
Style develop-
ments
Balmoral type of
shoe originated by
by Prince Albert
in 1853
Many shoemaking and
leather refinements
introduced during
this period* Be-
ginning of machine
age which permitted
new and greater
style developments
Movement of
manufacturing
New York state
and Ohio River
Valley in addi-
tion to the areas
already mentioned
Missouri, Illinois,
Michigan and Wis-
consin in addition
to the areas al-
ready mentioned
--
-
*
-
-
.
-
-
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TABLE II: INDUSTRIAL STAGES OF SHOECRAFT IN AMERICA (CONT'D)
1900-1945
Market developed
by
Expansion of world
markets
Shoes produced by Machines* Manu-
facturer workshops
Tools used tower machines
How employees Piece work and
were paid hourly rates
Shoes made princi- Retailers
pally for and sold
direct to
Manufacturing snoemakirig ma-
developments chines leased on
royalty basis to
shoe manufactu-
rers
Style develop-
ments
The greatest era
of style develop-
ment of the indus-
try* Introduction
of many new colors,
leathers, fabrics
and designs to co-
ordinate with
dress fashions
Movement of
manufa cturing
Pacific Coast in
addition to the
areas already men-
tioned
Source: Harold R. Quimby* The Story of Footwear, p* 6
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due left from the cost of conversion. In support of this
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston had this to say in its
November, 1948 bulletin-
The shoe industry has provided New England
as a whole with an important source of purchasing
power to finance its imports of commodities and
services from other regions of the United States
and abroad. In 1947 net exports of shoes from
New England amounted to approximately $400,000,000.
About $250,000,000 were required to finance the
net imports of hides and leather, leaving
roughly $150,000,000 available to meet New
England 1 s general needs.
Regardless of its importance regionally-- to the
states, to the workers and to New England finance--and its
leadership over all shoe-producing areas, there has been a
decline in the contribution of New England shoe production
for national consumption. From 1935 to 1942 shoe production
remained constant at 35$ of national output. In 1943 pro-
duction fell off proportionally more than total production.
No doubt, this was due to heavy losses of skilled labor to
the armed services and to the booming war industries with
their more attractive wages. Output, as a result, amounted
to only 33$ of national production.
With the end of the war and increased consumer
spending, production jumped to 36$ in September, 1946. In
October all production fell off, with New England output
slumping more rapidly than any other area. By 1947 total
output had shrunk to 31$. "The regional production was
21.9$ lower than the 1946 volume as compared with a national
..
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shrinkage of only 11. 5%." (1)
The pattern of decline has manifested itself most
strongly in men' s and women’s shoes, products in which New
England has been a long-time leader. In some years the de-
cline has been as much as 40% in men’ s shoes and 38% in
women’s shoes. (2)
Some of the reasons for this decline are:
1
—
The construction of western plants near
their distributing areas.
2—
-The heavy taxation which the New England
industry must bear in comparison to no
taxes or low taxes for competitors in
other areas.
3 The high cost of transportation both for
raw materials and finished goods.
4 Poor merchandising policies on the part
of the manufacturers themselves. (3)
1
—
-Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 2
2—
Ibid
3 Boston Chamber of Commerce. The Shoe Manufacturing
Industry of New England, p. 12-13
..
t
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TABLE III: PERCENTAGE OF SHOE PRODUCTION BY STATES
STATE 1899 1904 1909 1914 1919 1921 1923
United States t TOO” mr Too” Tffi5” tott* mr
Massachusetts 47,1 44.3 41.4 39.4 35.3 30.0 25.6
Maine 4.9 3.8 3.3 5.4 5.8 5.9 5.0
New Hampshire 9.7 9.1 9.0 8.4 6.9 5.2 6.4
New York 8.9 9.8 10.0 13.3 19.0 22.3 21.6
Pennsylvania 5.7 5.5 6.2 7.6 7.1 6.6 5.2
Ohio 6.4 7.5 6.6 6.1 5.4 5.9 5.0
Illinois 2.8 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.2 4.2 (18.5)
Missouri 3.8 6.8 9.1 7.1 8.0 9.4
Wisconsin 1.6 1.8 2.6 2.9 3.4 3.4 4.8
Other States 9.1 8.9 8.9 7.0 5.9 7.1 6.9
STATE 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1936
United States W URT TUcT Too Too” TOO” TOO”
Massachusetts 22.3 24.0 23.4 24.0 21.4 19.6 20.3
Maine 5.2 4.3 4.3 4.7 5.7 6.6 6.8
New Hampshire 5.5 6.0 6.9 7.5 6.0 7.8 8.1
New York 22.5 22.9 21.7 23.1 22.0 21.7 20.5
Pennsylvania 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.4 5.4 5.7 5.7
Ohio 4.6 3.8 3.3 3.1 4.0 4.3 4.1
Illinois
’*(22.2) 7.3 7.5 7.2 7.4 7.0 6.7
Missouri 13.0 13.3 12.3 12.5 11.3 10.8
Wisconsin 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.1 5.4 4.4 4.1
Other States 7.3 8.9 10.0 9.6 10.2 11.6 12.9
STATE 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
United States TTO” Tc5o" Toc5” 100 100 100 100
Massachusetts 19.5 19.2 19.5 18.9 18.5 19.0 18.6
Maine 6.1 6.9 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.0 5.5
New Hampshire 8.1 9.4 9.0 9.2 9.1 9.5 8.6
New York 20.2 18.0 16.6 17.7 18.0 18.4 19.6
Pennsylvania 6.3 7.0 7.7 8.9 9.2 8.5 8.2
Ohio 4.2 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.1
Illinois 7.0 6.8 7.5 7.1 7.2 7.8 7.7
Missouri 11.1 10.8 11.5 11.3 12.0 11.6 11.7
Wisconsin 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.2 4.3
Other States 13.5 13.5 13.4 12.8 12.3 11.5 12.2
‘^Bracketed figures combine totals for both Illinois and
Missouri,

29
TABLE III: PERCENTAGE OF SHOE PRODUCTION BY STATES (CONT’D)
STATE 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948
United States Too“ ToD"~ 100 ToD“ TOCT
Massachusetts 19.0 19.6 20.7 17.0 17.3
Maine 5.3 5.6 6.1 6.0 5.3
New Hampshire 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.7
New York 20.7 20.8 19.0 18.0 18.6
Pennsylvania 7.9 7.8 8.2 8.0 8.6
Ohio 3.1 3.3 3.3 4.0 3.8
Illinois 7.4 6.9 6.6 7.0 6.6
Missouri 11.7 11.6 11.4 14.0 13.3
Wisconsin 3.8 3.6 3.5 4.0 3.7
Other States 11.9 12.3 13.0 14.0 14.6
Source: National Shoe Manufacturers Association. Facts
and Figures on Footwear, p. 7
Department of Commerce. Facts for Industry,
March 10, 1949.
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III. RESEARCH BY THE INDUSTRY
A* Patents and Processes
1. Manufacturing Procedures
Probably the two most fundamental contributions to
large-scale production in the shoe industry have been Elias
Howe’s sewing machine and Lyman Blake’s mechanical stitcher.
These machines were developed during an era (the nineteenth
century) when the shoe industry was expanding at its most
rapid pace--in keeping with the industrial expansion of the
United States, Though there have been many improvements in
shoe machinery, ever since the origination and growth of
the leasing system (see Chapter I, page I3)
,
the development
of mechanical apparatus has remained peculiarly outside of
the shoe industry itself. Hence, apart from machine evolu-
tion, the modern-day shoe has been the result of improve-
ments in tanning, cutting and assembling, (1)
Shoe manufacture in the early Colonial period was
crude. The shoemaker, working at a small bench, had only
crudely tanned leather and simple tools such as his awl,
knife and needle. In two days, by working diligently, he
could produce a single pair of misshapen shoes. This, of
1
—Indeed, this evolution has also been helped by modern
machinery, but the author wishes to limit his statement
only to development within the shoe industry itself.
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course, is in striking contrast to the average ten pairs per
day per worker of modem industry, (1) In any case, an ex-
planation of how a shoe is made will illustrate better the
intricacies of shoe manufacturing.
The basic source of leather is the domestic cattle
supply. Each year the shoe industry tans the hides of
22,000,000 cows. To tan, color and finish high quality
leathers dyes, tannin, coal tar dyestuffs, rare wood ex-
tracts and "other ingredients" are utilized by skilled tan-
ners. (2) Once the leather has been fini shed-- tanning sole
leather requires about four months, uppers about sixty days--
it is then sorted for trimming and grading. After it has
been machine-measured for thickness, it is ready for ship-
ment to the shoe manufacturers. Grading involves classifi-
cation by weight and by type, upper or sole. Though the
industry relies mainly on the hides of cattle, more expen-
sive skins, such as goat, sheep, reptile and horse, are also
used.
The first operation by the shoe manufacturer is
to sort and grade the leather and then cut it into small
sections for assembling and stitching. (3) The upper
leather is cut into various sections such as the vamp, quar-
ter and tongue. Usually the cutting is done by a razor-
1
—
National Shoe Manufacturers Association. Shoemaking in
Action, p. 4
2 Ibid, p. 1
3 Ibid, p. 2
id- cd J t
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edged steel die or "clicking" die. (1) ^or finer grades
of leather or for better shoes with a limited volume, the
cutting is done by hand. Linings are also cut in this
department.
In the upper fitting department the uppers are
assembled together with the linings and stitched to make a
complete upper. Other processes in this room include
skiving, a method of smoothing uppers, perforating tips,
making button holes, and "lacing” eyelets to hold the uppers
to the lasts during the latter stages of completing the shoe.
Leather soles are cut from a heavier leather than
the uppers; hence, the operation is customarily the work of
another department called the stock fitting room. Because
of the toughness and rigidity of the sole leather, heavier
machinery than that required in upper cutting is necessary.
After the cutting, the soles "are graded for texture, thick-
ness, color and weight." (2) Those sections of the hide
which are not used for the outsole are then cut into insoles,
counters, welting, heels and box toes. (3)
In the lasting operation the upper and lining are
stretched over a wooden last and fastened to it. This is
f
a delicate operation in which the upper must be pulled
tight over the last. Usually this is done by a pull-over
1
—
Ibid, p. 2
2—
-Ibid, p. 5
3—
United Shoe Machinery Corporation. How Modem Shoes are
Made, p. 15
.v
.
c.
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*
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machine to eliminate human error. When the job is comple-
ted, the outsole is attached to the shoe bottom. This
operation is known as ’’bottoming,
” (1)
After the outsole has been bottomed, the heel is
attached to the shoe. This is done in the making room.
Here too, the heel and sole are trimmed. Leather and rubber
heels are attached by means of nail driving machinery.
In the finishing room the soles are waxed and
polished. The lasts are finally removed and the shoe bottoms
branded. Minor operations such as the insertion of heel
pads follow the branding, and after an inspection, the shoes
are sent on to the treeing and packing departments. There
the shoes receive a cleaning, dressing and packaging prior
to shipment,
2, Nomenclature
Of the three fundamental methods of bottoming or
attaching the outsole to the upper — the sewed shoe, the
cemented shoe and the nailed shoe — there are many differ-
ent processes in each group: (2)
Cemented Shoes
Littleway Staple Lasted Cement Shoe
Tack Lasted Cemented Shoe
Cement Lasted Cemented Shoe
Skeleton Insole Cemented Shoe
SilhouweXt and Cement Welt
1
—
Ibid, p, 16
2 Ibid, p. 17
.[' 5.
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—
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Sewed Shoes
Goodyear Welt Shoe
Goodyear Turn Shoe
McKay Sewed Shoe
Stitchdown Shoe
Littleway Lockstitch Shoe
Uco Lockstitch Shoe
Pre-WeIt Shoe
Skeleton Insole Sewed Shoe
Littleway McKay Sewed Shoe
Nailed Shoes
Nailed Shoe (Loose Nails)
Standard Screw Shoe
Pegged Shoe
B. Styles
1, Introduction
The style factor is the most influential single
element in shoe manufacturing--both for women’ s and men’
s
shoes. Shoe styles have been known to become unfashionable
even while the manufacturer was producing the shoes. Other
fashions have lasted hundreds of years; some have only man-
aged to survive from fashion period to fashion period. Many
styles are directly borrowed from the ancients; many are the
doubtful creations of modem designers.
Because of the early location of the shoe industry
in New England, the styling of shoes went hand in hand with
production. New England never relinquished this leadership,
particularly in the high-priced men’ s shoe field. However,
it has lost some ground in the last few years. (1)
In the women’ s field where style is the causa
1--Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 7
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belli. New England leads the pack* Just after the Civil
War shoe designing developed into an important factor in
production* Emphasis shifted from durability and quality to
novelty* (1) Business increased as shoes went out of
style* Furthermore, skilled workers, needed for these non-
staple lines were available in New England*
High quality as well as style has also been a
New England tradition* According to Consigners Reports for
1949, six out of the top twelve shoes tested for quality
were made by New England manufacturers* Furthermore, these
shoes either sold below those produced elsewhere, or equaled
the lower price ranges of the more expensive types. This
tendency seems to be true also in the women 1 s shoe divi-
sion* (2)
2* The Different Styles (3)
The balmoral shoe originated in 1853 at Balmoral,
Scotland among the dandies of Prince Albert* s court* The
shoe features a closed throat (see illustration), a whole
vamp and either five or six eyelets. The toe was generally
pointed and thinner uppers were used to make the foot
appear smaller for the tight-bottom trousers which were
1-
r-Edgar M. Hoover, Jr. Location Theory and the Shoe and
Leather Industries, p. 175
2
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p* 7
3-
-National Shoe Manufacturers Association. Style in Shoes,
p. 6-19
.*
*
*
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then the style on the con-
tinent. Today the balmor-
al is a narrow shoe with
accentuated pointed toes,
used successfully in both
men and women’s models. (1)
The blucher
pattern, though earlier
models existed as far
back as 1600, is prim-
arily a military design. It was named after General Leb-
erecht von Blucher, a Prussian general and the sponsor of
this shoe. It was higher than the low cut shoe worn by
the military men of the early 1800’ s and seemed to be more
satisfactory--for fighting
purposes. It has existed
with some variation to the
present time. The blucher
pattern is a basic one for
"town, sports, play and
leisure shoes of regula-
tion oxford height; work
and outdoor shoes and
field, army, navy and aviation boots. 11 (2)
1—
Ibid, p. 6
2
—
Ibid, p. 7
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The boot design
is one of the earliest
known patterns of shoe
construction* Boots were
known to the Egyptians of
4500 B,C,; and to the
Etruscans of the fifth
and sixth centuries B,C,
Certainly the martial
boot of brass flourished
in the civilizations of
the Greeks and Romans,
Through the centuries boots became the badge of class. They
reached their most elegant stage in the court of Charles II,
King of France (832-877); the courtiers wore boots with
lace-trimmed tops. By the fifteenth century boots had
evolved to the right and left stage, and some had spurs and
long, upturned toes. Boots became the military shoe — from
the high-heeled, red leather boots of the knights to the
rough-finished combat boot of the World War II infantryman.
In modem times boots have also been used for fishing,
riding, aviation, trapping, hunting and mining. Generally
boots are unlined and made of water-resistant leathers, (1)
According to an old Irish legend the brogue was
first made for a distressed maiden by a fairy queen and her
1
— Ibid, p. 8
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court* Originally it
was a one-piece shoe of
crudely-tanned leather.
It first found favor
among the Irish. Later,
in Scotland, it developed
into a heavy, water-
proofed affair called
the brog. Modem shoe
manufacture further cor-
rupted the style, using the name for a highly perforated
shoe which is usually a wing- tip type of heavy, grained
leathers. (1)
In 1838 Count Alfred Guillaume Gabriel D* Orsay, a
soldier of fortune, invented the V-shape cut on a pump and
from him came the style known as D* Orsay. The pump is novel
in that the D f Orsay cut is
supposed to prevent gaping
of the sides which are cut
into a V below the throat
of the pump to gain this
effect. The D’ Orsay has
had many variations —
in anklets and straps,
collars and appliques
1--Ibid, p. 8
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without affecting its
practicability, (1)
The Ghillie
first became popular in
more modem times when
the fashionable Prince
of Wales, now the Duke
of Windsor, popularized
the style. However, the
Ghillie shoe was a well-known type in Scotland about 1890,
Its name came from a Scottish word ‘’gillie'* or young serving
boy. Later it was changed into its present spelling. The
ghillie shoe itself is distinguished by its lacing rather
than any particular type of leather or special appearance.
There are usually three slots through which a leather thong
is threaded, thus elimina-
ting the necessity of eye-
lets, hooks or buttons, (2)
The gore or
elastic shoe was first
produced in 1836 by J,
Sparkes Hall, Queen Vic-
toria’ s bootmaker. At
that time the webbing of
1— Ibid, p. 10
2—
Ibid
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the shoe was a combination of wire and rubber. Later after
vulcanization, many American companies were able to produce
a more elastic webbing. Gore shoes, though not as popular
as other women’ s models, still have wide-spread acceptance
in this country, (1)
Reputedly the
jodhpur was designed in
ancient Persia, In 1865
it was brought to the
European continent by
Anglo-Indian soldiers as
a special type of shoe
used for riding and more
particularly for polo.
However, this shoe was
well-known to western civilization about 1624 in a more modi-
fied form. The present
jodhpur is an extremely
popular t3rpe in men’s styles;
especially as military dress
shoes, (2)
Actually the In-
dian moccasin was the first
of American -styled shoes
.
« A'
MOCCAJ'IN
1—
Ibid, p. 11
2-
-Ibid, p. 12
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It was skillfully made and gave the hunter a great deal of
protection* ^ince then, it has developed into a useful
sports and outdoor shoe, and its styling has been incorpo-
rated into many of the more rigid shoes, particularly in
the blucher design* (1)
The monk shoe
is primarily a military
style shoe, but origin-
ally it was invented by
an Alpine monk of the
fifteenth century* The
buckles made the shoe
easy to put on and keep
on and its broad sturdi-
ness and simplicity had a
ever, with some modifica-
tions it has been used in
the women’s field* (2)
The etymology
of the mule, the popular
household slipper, was
derived from the early
Sumerians who disting-
uished outdoor from in-
1-
-Ibid, p. 13
2-
-Ibid, p. 14
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.
door slippers by the word "mulu." The mule became popular
in the Elizabethan age when fine ladies used a mule to
cover their elaborate shoes from dirt. Since then it has
not changed much in appearance, maintaing the same vamp,
sole and heel. (1)
The oxford,
first used in Oxford,
England in 1640, is
actually not a type or
pattern, but rather a
descriptive catch-all
for any low-cut shoe*
The oxford came into
favor because of the
greater foot freedom and coolness which it offered over the
boot or high- cut shoe. In the twentieth century it became
the most popular type of footwear. Two distinct types have
now developed — "the plugged oxford which has a wide base
at the throat in the form of an inverted plug," and the
saddle shoe which has contrasting leather. The saddle has
become standard footwear with the American adolescent and
the younger college undergraduate. (2)
The origination of the pump has never been defi-
nitely settled. Indeed, it is one of the oldest of shoe
1—
Ibid, p. 14
2
—
Ibid, p. 15
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styles. The modem ver-
sion was primarily used
as a dancing shoe for
men* Later, by means of
special lasts, it was
adapted to women’s shoes.
Although simple in de-
sign, it is difficult to
make a pump with good
fitting qualities. This
is due to the long top line which tends to gap as the
wearer walks. Special lasts have somewhat remedied thi
gaping though not completely. (1)
Of all the foot-
wear of modem society the
most widely-used shoe is
the sandal. It is the
earliest tyoe shoe of
which there is any record;
a sandal was discovered
near Cairo, Egypt dating
back more than 4000 years.
Early sandals were made of
rushes or plants. Later thongs were used to secure the
sandal to the foot. With the passing of centuries, new
1— Ibid, p. 16
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developments changed the outline of the sandal; heels were
added, soles thickened and straps were attached. But the
basic comfort of the sandal, the feature which made it so
desirable, was never altered. Today sandals are used for
beachwear, sports, hiking, and dress affairs. There has
been a wide range of materials used in its composition such
as leather, cork, wood, rubber and even rope. (1)
The shawl tongue
shoe was first worn by
Greek women athletes in
100 B.C. It first became
acceptable on a large
scale in seventeenth cen-
tury England where it was
designed to simulate the
high boots of the upper
class. In Scotland it
was developed into a utilitarian shoe. About 1925 the Prince
of Wales made it fashionable when he introduced the shawl
shoe with his highland kilts. It never has been too popular
in the United States, though many American women have
accepted the shawl attached to a blucher type of shoe. (2)
Though not a basic type of footwear, and a des-
criptive word like oxford, the strap was first introduced
1
—
Ibid, p. 16
2 Ibid, p. 18
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on the sandal. In all of
Its long history its pri-
mary usage was for attach-
ment purposes. Later
with the development of
style in the shoe i.ndus-
try it took on a new as-
pect, that of decoration.
Usually straps adorn any
of the basic styles men-
tioned in preceding pages— sometimes in series of twos or
threes. (1)
3. The Development of Lasts
Until the invention of a lathe in 1815 by Thomas
Blanchard of Sutton, Massachusetts, shoe lasts were whittled
from wood in the general shape of the foot. The shoes
which were fitted over these lasts naturally were irregu-
larly made, binding or constricting the foot of the wearer.
At first Blanchard’s lathe was used primarily for making
gun stocks, but later was adapted to last making. However,
the Gilman lathe was more widely-used because it permitted
the machinist to grade the sizes of the lathe. The origi-
nal Blanchard last could turn out only two gun stocks or
irregular lasts per hour; modern lasting machines can turn
1
— Ibid, p. 18
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TABLE IV: BASIC TYPES OF SHOES
NAME TYPE ORIGIN WORN BY
Balmoral A closed throat
lace shoe
Originated by Prince
Albert in 1853
Men, Women
& Children
Blucher An open throat
laced shoe
Sponsored by General
von Blucher as an
army shoe in 1810.
Previously worn in
16th and 17th cen-
turies
Men, Women
& Children
Boot Footwear that
has a top
reaching above
ankle
Coeval with history
of man* Used as
early as 600 B*C*
Men & Boys
Brogue Heavy waterproof
shoe with large
perforations
Originated in Ire-
land in about the
year 1790
Men
D* Orsay Pump with V-eut
top side line
Invented by Count
D» Orsay, France, in
1838
Women
Ghillie Features unique
slotted front
lace
Originated in Scot-
land in ancient
Gaelic times
Women
Gore Features elasti-
cized side or
front
Invented by J.
Spark es Hall, Lon-
don, in 1836
Men &
Women
Jodhpur Two-eyelet ankle
high boot type
Designed centuries
ago by Persians
Men &
Women
Moccasin Inserted circu-
lar tongue
attached to one-
piece vamp
Invented by Ameri-
can Indians
Men, Women
& Children
Monk Three piece
upper with side
buckle
Originally worn by
Alpine monks*
Conceived centuries
Men &
Women
ago
1.
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TABLE IV: BASIC TYPES OF SHOES (CONT’D)
NAME TYPE ORIGIN WORN BY
Mule A high heel
slipper with no
counter or
quarter
Worn as early as
1600 when heels were
introduced. Origin-
ally the "pantofles”
designed to protect
the fine shoes from
dirt; also worn for
bedroom slippers
Women
Oxford A broad descrip-
tive term usually
applied to lace
shoes with three
or more eyelets,
balmoral and
blucher
Origin credited to
Oxford, England, 300
years ago. At that
time a straight lace
shoe
Men, Women
& Children
Pump Lowest cut of
all shoes
Used for centuries.
Modern version re-
designed as dancing
slipper in 1906
Men, Women
& Children
Sandal Low heeled open
shoe
Earliest type of
footwear. Designed
centuries ago by
Egyptians. Coeval
with history of man
Women &
Children
Shawl
Tongue
Sometimes
called "Kiltie.”
Has long folded
slashed tongue
covering lacing
Worn as early as
100 B.C. by Greek
women athletes
Women
Strap A broad descrip-
tive tern applied
to shoes having
one or more
straps across in-
step
Designed centuries
ago by Egyptians
Women &
Children
Source: National Shoe Manufacturers Association.
Shoes, p. 4-5
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out a last every five minutes* (1)
The first New England lasting company was set up
by a Richard Richards in Lynn, Massachusetts about 1820*
But it wasn*t until 1839 that the first non-New England
lasting factory was established at Dayton, Ohio* (2)
Even then lasting was precariously done* One
last was used for two sizes merely by placing a pad over
the last* The two sizes had the distinguishing names of
slim and fat* Widths were unknown* Furthermore, upto the
time of the Civil War the same lasts (generally made of
maple wood) were used for both feet* Shoes were straight,
because lasts were straight. Foot contours meant nothing*
Upto 1880 shoes had only three widths and ran in
full sizes* Half-sizes were introduced after this period
and were permanently accepted by the shoe industry as the
standard method of sizing, notwithstanding the introduction
of quarter-sizes in the early twentieth century* About
this time a standard list of last measurements was published
in the shoe industry* This codified and simplified the last
making procedures* (3)
The period just preceding the turn of the century
was a fairly stable one in the shoe industry* Shoes did
not fluctuate in their style appeal and consequently there
1
—
National Shoe Manufacturers Association. The Story of
Lasts, p* 2
2—
Ibid
3—
-Ibid, p. 3
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was little improvement in the last produced* But after the
turn of the century, when shoe manufacturing began to mush-
room, new lasts were developed* More competition for the
entrenched New England shoe industry sprang up in the ex-
panding Middle West* Up til and including World War I shoe
production levelled off and the demand for improved lasts
became somewhat stationary* However, the period of the
early twenties was a period of new styles and new tastes*
Novelty shoes with their quickly changing styles dominated
the women’s shoe field. (1) The demand for these shoes
outran the number of lasts available* Fashion also demanded
from the shoe manufacturer better fitting shoes. At first
the last industry could not expand fast enough, but after
the initial boom, last production finally managed to catch
up with shoe production, and from that time, 1920, last
making has not developed or changed basic methods of manu-
facture.
Lasts are made from kiln-dried rock maple --
obtained from New York, Vermont, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania.
The virgin wood is cut at rough last block mills. (2)
After drying in air-dried sheds for six to nine months, the
rough blocks are kiln dried to remove whatever moisture
remains in the wood* The blocks are then forwarded to last
factories for further finishing which is one of the few
1-
-Ibid, p. 6
2—
Ibid, p. 11
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in the shoe and shoe findings industries that is still done
only by order. (1)
When the manufacturer calls for a specific type of
last, the rough blocks are placed in the lasting machine and
a left and right are produced simultaneously, from a master
model. The lasts then have hinges, metal thimbles, rivets,
leather tops and iron heel plates attached. After the lasts
are sanded, polished and paired, they are ready for ship-
ment to the manufacturer. (2)
Last styles set the ultimate style for the con-
sumer. As such they originate with the last modelmaker, or
the last salesmen, or shoe manufacturers who have a con-
stant feel and contact with the market. The retailers who
sell the footwear can also sense what the customer wants, or
judge by sales the trend of footwear. (3) What is more,
the competition from foreign importations influence and
change the styles of shoe lasts. Mexico, for instance, has
developed the hurache, a style which has become a favorite
for summer wear all over the United States. (4) All these
factors acting in combination or individually help deter-
mine the last which, in turn, helps determine what the
ultimate consumer will wear this Fall, Winter, Spring or
Summer.
__ __
1—
Ibid
2— Ibid, p. 12
3— Ibid, p. 13
4—
Ibid
•s
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4, The Sizing System
Basically there are two systems employed in this
country- -the American system and the French system, (1)
Both are comparatively simple to understand. The American
sizes are classified in the following manner:
Type Size
Infants' First Run (Cacks)
Infants’ Second Run
Children'
s
Little Gents'
Misses'
Youths'
Growing Girls'
Boys
'
Women'
s
Men'
s
0-5
5i-8
8§-ll
8srll
lli-2
ll-J-2
2i-9
2£-6
3-10
5-15
All shoes have their sizes printed on the inside
section of the shoe (usually on the right hand side of the
lining near the heel). Some shoes will be marked 6C, others,
360, When numbers are used, the first number is the width,
the second number the size, and the third number the half-
size or zero. The numbers which follow to the right are
case numbers, the stock number and the pairs per case.
Example: 065 (6-jjrAA) 565 (stock number) 12493 (case
number) 12 (pairs per case).
The French system is based upon the key number
52 , This figure is subtracted from the first two given
figures to obtain the length. When the last figure is sep-
arated from the first by a dash, it indicates a half size.
1--Ibid, p. 15-16
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For instance, 40-14 is 82D. The figure one used in this
example merely indicates that one is A and is disregarded
for determining size; the figure 4 indicates a D width.
Widths
000—AAAA
00—AAA
0—
AA
1—
A
2—
B
3—
G
4—
D
5
—
E
6—
EE
7 EEE
." t
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IV. MATERIALS
A. Leather
1. Relation to the Shoe Industry
Of all the materials used in the shoe industry,
leather is by far the most important. Its uses are numer-
ous; for instance, shoe uppers, soles, linings, heel pads,
heels, trims and bows are composed of leather. (1) Almost
from the beginning of the shoe industry leather has been
the main material in the construction of shoes. So long
has this combination existed that the two have become syn-
onymous in the eyes of the consuming public.
2. Importance to Hew England
Because leather is such a desirable product for
shoe manufacturing, the shoe industry is the principal
buyer of hides, both domestic and foreign. (2) In relation
to the nearness of a domestic hide supply New England is at
a geographi cal disadvantage only
,
inasmuch as the hide sup-
ply depends on the location of cattle, and the location of
cattle depends on natural advantages for stock breeding not
inherent in this area. But New England has nullified this
1-
-National Cotton Council of America. Cotton in the Shoe
Industry, introduction.
2-
-Edgar M. Hoover, Jr. Location Theory and the Shoe and
Leather Industries, p. 117
1*
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discrepancy by exploiting foreign markets for other leathers.
In fact, it has done so from the very beginning of its his-
tory, Hoover quotes from "Some Influences of the Sea upon
the Industries of New England" to illustrate how the sea was
an important factor in Boston’s shoe development: (1)
The shoe industry as well as the cotton
industry has been able to attain first place in
New England because the sea was close at hand.
Although shoemaking was a local industry in all
the American colonies, it attained distinction
in Massachusetts, Everywhere else the village
cobblers were hampered by a lack of raw material
and confined to a local market by the difficul-
ties of transportation. Only at Lynn were these
obstacles removed. Lynn lay between Salem and
Boston, two of the principal colonial ports.
The boats that carried fish and other products
away from these harbors brought back cargoes of
hides collected from scores of places touched on
the voyages. Some vessels made special trips to
the west coast of South America and California
with the sole purpose of gathering hides for the
New England tanneries.
Purthemore, New England’s importance as a dairy
and meat center made available a large supply of domestic
leather at the local slaughtering centers whi ch would ordi-
narily not be procurable. Since hides and skins are a sec-
ondary part of cattle raising--meat and dairy products being
the main sources of revenue— slaughtering is done near the
principal dairy markets, (2)
Hence, in relation to other producers. New England
is not at any particular competitive disadvantage in its
importation of domestic hides, Low freight charges- -about
1—
Ibid, p. 128
2—
Ibid, p. 127
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one per cent--do not influence manufacturing costs to a
great extent. (1) As a matter of fact, the numerous tan-
neries and shoe supply houses in this area offset this dif-
ferential in domestic hides; the materials from these sub-
sidiary industries are exported to other shoe-producing
states. (2)
B. Tanneries
The existence of tanneries is essential to shoe
manufacturers for the supply of treated leather. At first
the tanning industry was located close to forest areas—
because of the abundant bark supply necessary in the tanning
process— therefore, there was no limiting factor in the
selection of a tannery site since the country was heavily
forested. But tanneries were selected with an eye to other
advantages such as the nearness of the leather supply and
transportation costs. Since New England, which lay on the
seaboard, could supply cheap water transportation, the tan-
nery industry concentrated in this area.
As time went on, the supplies of bark, a necessity
in tanning, became depleted. Too, the advantage of cheap
water power was offset by the development of the railroads
and nthe process of bark-leaching and the use of concentrated
1
—
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 6
2—
Ibid
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tropical extracts and inorganic tanning agents made it no
longer necessary for tanneries to locate near forests.” (1)
Hence, tanneries began to move westward to be nearer their
base of supplies. This meant an expansion of the tannery
industry into the western area and a consequent separation
of the tannery center into divisions, one to supply the West
and the other to supply New England. This dichotomy had
little effect on New England since the main problem was not
one of nearness to materials, but nearness to markets. (2)
In any case, there exists in New England today a heavy con-
centration of tanneries in spite of the west and southwest
movements during the early part of this century. (3)
C. Other Materials
Cotton is also a major source of supply for the
shoe industry. Cotton represents about 34^ of the materials
consumed in shoemaking. (4) Principally cotton's impor-
tance lies in linings; in fact, it is used far more than
leather in this respect (see Table V). Cotton fabrics also
compete with leather in the upper shoe market and have been
used successfully for insoles, box toes and outsoles.
1-
-Edgar M. Hoover, Jr. Location Theory and the Shoe and
Leather Industries, p. 270
2-
-Ibid, p. 265
3-
-E9deral Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 6
4-
-National Cotton Council of America. Cotton in the Shoe
Industry, p. 1
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TABLE V: ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION OF MATERIALS IN SHOES
1947
USE TOTAL ALL MATERIALS* COTTON
(Cotton Bale Equivalents) BALES OF TOTAL
Uppers 130,100 15,990 12.3
Linings 94,120 62,190 66.1
Bottoms 99,420 15,130 15.2
Laces 12,780 12,000 93.9
Thread 15, 380 12,760 83.0
Total 351,800 118,070 38.7
*Including cotton, leather, rayon, wool, rubber, etc.,
measured in terms of cotton bale equivalents
.
Source: National Cotton Council of America. Cotton in the
Shoe Industry, p. 1
• <
.
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Cotton markets are located in the southern part of
the country--and as such do not give one shoe producing area
any great advantage over the other. Furthermore, since the
cost of cotton fabrics is high and since producers have had
more experience with leather, cotton materials are limited
to certain types and definite quantities in those types.
Other materials which are used in shoe manufacture
play a minor role in production. They are listed as fol-
lows: (1)
Rayon-- TJsed as linings for women’s shoes.
Because all-rayon linings are not dur-
able, they contain a cotton filling.
Wool--Limited to wool gabardine uppers.
Plastics—Generally unsatisfactory for linings
because of stretching and shrinking
qualities
•
Nylon--Has limited use because of the diffi-
culty of adapting it to sewing machines,
though it has a high tensile strength
and elasticity.
Linen- -Used in welt sewing because of its
strength and durability. High costs
prohibit wide usage.
Silk—Although this material is ideal for
sewing because of its strength, high
costs have cut its consumption.
D, Costs
In dollar value mounting costs of materials have
1
— Ibid, p, 4-5
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squeezed the profit margins of the New England shoe pro-
ducers. However, the make-up of costs on a percentage basis
has not materially altered since pre-war days; the bulk of
all costs lies in materials and supplies. (1) The tables
below have undergone little change for 1947 and 1948. (2)
Item Women’s Shoes Men’s Shoes
(July 1, ’41) (July 28, ’43)
Leather costs 39.9$ 43.5$
Cloth linings and doublers 2.6 1.4
Findings, laces, etc. 4.7 4.7
Cartons and cases 2.0 1.4
Lasts, dies and patterns 2.3 .4
Total material and supplies 51.5$ 51.4$
Labor costs 29.5 24.2
Royalties 2.1 1.8
Other factory expense 6.6 6.0
Selling and Administrative
costs (excl. advertising) 10.3 16.6
100.0$ 100.0$
As for non-labor costs, there are marked diver-
gences in such items as fuel. power, interest. insurance and
taxes especially among intra-regional firms. (3) These
differences in some cases have brought about migration from
one New England state to another, and from the New England
states to other regions.
1
—
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 6
2—
Ibid
3—
-Associated Industries of Massachusetts. Economic Report
on Massachusetts Industry, January 31, 1949, p. 6
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V. THE AGE OF THE INDUSTRY
A. The Stages
The growth and development of industry in the
national economy Is not unlike that of the growth and de-
velopment and eventual decline of the human being. In the
early stages a new product Is introduced and becomes ex-
tremely popular. Demand increases. The industry begins to
feel its growing pains as many small companies struggle to
exploit the market (Stage I), The industry is prosperous
until overproduction occurs. Then the new companies are
eliminated and only those in strong financial positions are
left (Stage II).
However, the persistence of the market demand
causes the remaining companies to grow and expand even in
the face of a counter-movement by the business cycle (Stage
III)
.
Adolescence has now been reached and the industry
"begins to feel the tidelike pull of the business cycle." (1)
Total volume remains steady, though it is not now on a
rising curve. The industry experiences some downward trends
when a change takes place in the business cycle (Stage IV).
But it continues to progress vigorously, though flattening
1--Investment Bankers Association of America. Fundamentals
of Investment Banking, p. 45
..
.
,
.
Millions
of
Persons
62
CHART 2 : CIVILIAN POPULATION AND SHOE CONSUMPTION
*1948 estimated
Sources: Bureau of the Census
Boot and Shoe Recorder
Secondary Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston* Monthly
Review, December 1948.
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its curve with each succeeding business recession.
At full maturity (stage V) the industry is closely
tied to the secular trend, and the progress or decline of
the national economy. Within the industry certain companies
may be able, by means of strong management, large financial
resources, successful marketing methods and progressive
labor-management relations, to run counter to the general
trend of the industry.
In its declining period (stage (VI) the industry
loses ground to other competitive forces or substitutes.
B. The Shoe Industry
In terms of the life cycle of the industry, shoe
manufacturing is in an advanced stage of development. The
industry is fully matured and is closely tied to the pro-
gress and decline of the national economy. The national
industry is in Stage V. Chart 2--Civilian Population and
Shoe Con sumption--clearly indicates that, except for brief
drops in consumption in 1921 and 1930-1931 and large in-
creases in 1946 and 1947, shoe consumption is closely asso-
ciated with population growth. In addition. Chart 3--
illustrating personal consumption expenditures--further
emphasizes the close relationship of shoe consumption to the
secular trend.
There is another point to be noted; within the
.•-
-
.
,
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CHART 4 : THEORETICAL PATTERN OF AN INDUSTRIAL LIFE CYCLE
'
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national industry New England shoe production is in its
declining stage or Stage VI. The pattern of productivity
for this area is a diminishing one. Competition from other
areas is challenging New England 1 s position as a leader in
production. The region is not holding its own; in periods
of prosperity output has gone up, but its downward trend
will be marked by a greater trough than any upward swing.
Prom the Civil War to 1948 the New England sector has been
losing its share of output while total shoe production has
been increasing with the increasing population.
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VI. THE ROLE OP LABOR
A. History
1* Introduction
In the beginning, two factors contributed to the
development of a highly skilled labor pool in New England:
the severe winter climate which limited farm produce and
consequently left farm workers available for other work and
a sea-going population which left families ashore. Both
sources were only too eager to supplement their incomes
through shoemaking; materials were available from the near-
by tanneries and no mechanical apparatus was needed.
Gradually a labor pool was built up in certain
highly-populated areas. Shoemaking began to be a full-
time industry with full-time wage earners. More production
led to increasing specialization which, in turn, led to
lower production costs and better shoes.
Most of the simple work was carried on in the
homes of the workers, but finished pieces which required a
high degree of skill or some mechanical operation were done
by the shoe producer.
As New England developed, and agriculture no
longer was an element of great importance in the economy,
a larger labor pool became available. Manufacturing became
extremely localized near the labor pools and from them
,1 '
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.
sprang up a trained and skilled group of shoe workers.
’’The character of the labor, as well as the local
market, determined the sort of footwear made in these
northern New England states. Boots and heavy work shoes
predominated with slippers and other easily-put-together
articles also represented.” (1)
2. The Unions
The development of the McKay stitcher just after
the Civil War presented two problems to New England: first,
skillful labor was not as necessary as it was during the
hand stage, therefore, the Mid-West with its untrained
labor could compete in shoe manufacturing and, secondly,
mechanization led to labor troubles.
Technological improvements threatened the position
of the skilled shoe workers; labor had to organize to pro-
tect itself. The first large-scale organization was the
Knights of St, Crispin in 1867, so named after a patron
saint of shoemakers. It did not last long, breaking up
because of poor financial structure and lack of power. (2)
From that point on came a succession of labor organization
(which are listed on the following page) none of which has
ever been strong enough to dominate the industry, or put
1
—
Edgar M. Hoover, Jr. Location Theory and the Shoe and
Leather Industries, p. 220
2-
-Horace B. Davis. Shoes: The Workers and the Industry,
p. 138
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TABLE VI: SHOE UNIONS
ORGANIZATION
Knights of Labor
Cutters
Lasters Protective
Union
Shoe Workers
Protective Union
United Shoe Workers
of America
Allied Shoe Workers
Union
Amalgamated Shoe
Workers of America
Associated Slipper
Workers Union of
New York City
United Shoe Workers
of America
Independent Shoe
Workers Union
Shoe and Leather
Workers Industrial
Union
National Shoe
Workers Association
LOCATION
Lynn, Brooklyn,
Philadelphia,
Rochester,
Milwaukee
Lynn, national
Haverhill
Lynn, New York City,
national
Lynn
Lynn
New York City
Lynn, Boston
New York City
New York City,
New England
Lynn, Boston
DATES
1885-1913
1879-1895
1899-1937
1909-1923
1912-1923
1923-1925
1928 1929
1929
-
1930
1929-1931
1931
-
1933
1932
-
1933
1 l
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TABLE VI: SHOE UNIONS (CONT'D)
ORGANIZATION
United Shoe and
Leather Workers
Union
Brotherhood of
Shoe and Allied
Craftsmen
LOCATION
National
Brockton, South
Shore of Massa-
chusetts
United Shoe Workers National
of America (C.I.O.)
DATES
1935-1937
1933 to
present
1937 to
present
Source: Horace B, Davis,
Industry, p, 177
Shoes: The Workers and the
. C
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the shoe woricers on a national basis.
The peculiar nature of the shoe industry has also
contributed to the growth of labor organizations. Shoe
unions have tended to concentrate where the industry has
become well established. This means that in cities like
Brockton, Haverhill, Lynn and Manchester, the unions have
their greatest strength while in small mid-western cities
labor unions have made no penetration at all. Generally,
where the unions have penetrated, they have raised the wage
scale (see Table IX) and have proven cooperative with man-
agement. (1)
The piecework system which is the main method of
payment in the Industry--though a few manufacturers have
attempted to change to an hourly basis--is another constant
source of friction. Rates for different processes are dif-
ferent, causing considerable confusion and resentment among
the workers. Too, piece ’work is subject to varied abuses
by the manufacturer—rates are often set according to the
fastest worker, thereby forcing other laborers to work at a
killing pace. (2)
Styles cause seasonal variations in production with
consequent unemployment periods. Hence, workers have at-
tempted to obtain a rate of pay high enough to cover them-
1-
-Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 6
2
—
Horace B. Davis. Shoes: The Workers and the Industry,
p. 108
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selves during the slack periods. Usually their demands are
made during the peak production months, the July to October
or February to March periods, (1)
On the other hand, employers have been able, in
many cases, to take advantage of the weak labor movement.
The use of violence and labor spies in the industry to
break up unionism was not an uncommon thing. In fact, the
industry was famous for the use of the "Yellow Dog Contract"
and the "Good Behavior Bond" in which the employee put up a
sum of money guaranteeing his good behavior. (2)
Another contributing factor to the prevention of
large-scale unionization has been the migratory aspect of
the industry. The majority of New England shoe manufac-
turers are small-scale operators. Inasmuch as they do not
have any investment in capital machinery, their plants can
be transferred from one area to another with great facility.
This has enabled them to shift from sector to sector to
avoid the high cost of unionization. Mobility was almost
necessary since a change in production costs could bankrupt
the marginal producer who, without the benefit of large-
scale efficiency, was trying to manufacture his product in
a highly competitive field. This excessive moving about led
to dispersion and the prevention of aggressive leadership in
the shoe unions. (3) What is more, migration was influ-
1—
Ibid, p. 121
2—
Ibid, p. 141-146
3—
-Ibid, p. 15
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TABLE VII: CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOTWEAR ESTABLISHMENTS
STUDIED BY THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCTOBER 1945
Establishments Unionization Percent
United States 347 196 56
New England 111 65 59
Middle 104 51 49
Atlantic
Border 15 8 53
Spates
Southeast 14 2 14
Great Lakes 53 42 79
Middle West 35 20 57
Pacific 15 8 53
Source: U*S* Department of -^abor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Footwear 1945, p. 12
;• <
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TABLE VIII: AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES (STRAIGHT-TIME HOURLY
EARNINGS) 1/ FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS IN FOOTWEAR
ESTABLISHMENTS, UNITED STATES AND SELECTED REGIONS,
OCTOBER 1945
United States New England
—1/
Occupation, grade and sex Number Average Number Average
of hourly of hourly
workers rates workers rates
PLANT WORKERS
Men
Bed Machine operators
Carpenters, maintenance
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, hand
Cutters, outsole, machine
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, machine
Edge setters
Edge trimmers, machine
Electricians, maintenance
Fancy stitchers
Floor boys
Goodyear stitchers
Heelers, leather, machine
Inspectors
Janitors
Machinists, maintenance
Maintenance men, general
utility
McKay stitchers
Mechanics, maintenance
Pattern workers
Pullers over, machine
Shoe cleaners
Skivers, upper and lining
machine
Sole attachers, cement
Stock clerks
Treers
Vampers
Watchmen
Wood heel attachers
Working foremen, processing
departments
3, 523 $1.18 1,411 $1.31
123 .89 52 .87
1,763 1.28 257 1.11
884 1.04 320 1.09
5,100 1.21 2,554 1.31
1,965 1.30 763 1.45
2,750 1.33 1,081 1.55
130 .98 39 1.05
239 1.31 67 1.14
659 .61 274 .66
2,037 1.07 697 1.27
924 1.08 327 1.29
588 .83 218 .87
1,057 .55 309 .54
196 1.00 51 1.21
321 .84 97 .96
267 1.21 157 1.24
402 1.00 176 1.08
53 1.23 25 1.09
1,955 1.20 780 1.39
276 1.14 27 1.10
•248 1.25 113 .90
688 1.16 332 1.13
504 .74 162 .81
2,005 1.22 1,360 1.30
741 1.32 339 1.14
696 .55 229 o 57
617 1.22 229 1.16
600 1.27 182 1.13
5
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TABLE VIII: AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES (STRAIGHT TIME-HOURLY
EARNINGS) 1/ FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS IN FOOTWEAR
ESTABLISHMENTS, UNITED STATES AND SELECTED REGIONS,
OCTOBER 1945 (CONT'D)
United States New England
27
Occupation, grade and sex Number Average Number Average
of hourly of hourly
workers rates workers rates
Women
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, hand
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, machine
Edge trimmers, machine
Fancy stitchers
Floor girls
Inspectors
Janitors
Pasters, backers, or
fitters, upper hand
Shoe cleaners
Skivers, upper and lining,
machine
Sole attachers, cement
Stock clerks
Treers
Vampers
Wood heel attachers
Wood heel coverers
"Working foremen, processing
departments
132 COc-• — —
930 .78 107 .86
149 .76 2 {$/)
6,363 .85 3,046 .96
1,273 .58 494 .59
1,778 .61 698 .62
91 .52 8 ( 3/)
4,868 .60 1,509 .63
1,396 .62 558 .59
2,090 .74 619 COo
374 .74 112 .98
136 .59 29 .62
1,486 .74 171 .83
3,657 .80 1,012 .97
138 .72 66 .74
314 .63 36 .67
141 .77 33 .76
1/ Excludes premium pay for overtime and night work*
2/ Includes data for other regions in addition to those
shown separately.
5/ Insufficient number of workers to justify presentation
of an average*
Source: U*S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Footwear 1945, p* 14
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TABLE IX: AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES ( STRAIGHT-TIME HOURLY
EARNINGS) 1/ FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS IN FOOTWEAR
ESTABLISHMENTS, UNITED STATES AND SELECTED REGIONS,
BY UNIONIZATION, OCTOBER 1945
UNITED STATES 2/
Union Non-Union
Occupation and sex establishments establishments
Number Average Number Average
of
workers
hou rly
rates
of
workers
hourly
rates
Men
Bed machine operators 2,129 $1.22 1,394 $1.11
Carpenters, maintenance 69 .88 54 .91
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, hand 1,218 1.37 545 1.07
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, machine 3,115 1.26 1,985 1.11
Cutters, outsole, machine 536 1.06 348 1.02
Edge Setters 1,306 1.35 659 1.21
Edge trimmers, machine 1,714 1.37 1,036 1.26
Electricians, maintenance 57 .92 73 1.02
Fancy stitchers 201 1.37 38 1.01
Floor boys 441 .61 218 .61
Goodyear stitchers 1,300 1.12 737 1.00
Heelers, leather, machine 566 1.13 358 1.00
Inspectors 379 .89 209 .72
Janitors 719 .55 338 .53
Machinists, maintenance 145 1.00 51 1.00
Maintenance men, general
utility 213 .84 108 .83
McKay stitchers 128 1.23 139 1.19
Mechanics, maintenance 185 1.03 217 .96
Pullers over, machine 1,146 1.26 809 1.11
Shoe cleaners 192 1.27 84 .82
Skivers, upper and lining,
machine 176 1.45 72 .75
Sole attachers, cement 393 1.30 295 .96
Stock clerks 279 .79 225 .68
Treers 1,371 1.25 634 1.16
Vampers 595 1.41 146 .98
Watchmen 419 .56 277 .53
Wood heel attachers 443 1.33 174 .97
Working foremen, processing
departments 353 1.38 247 1.10
1/ Excludes premium pay for overtime and night work.
Includes data for other regions in addition to those shown
separately.
5.
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TABLE IX: AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES (STRAIGHT TIME-HOURLY
EARNINGS) FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS IN FOOTWEAR
ESTABLISHMENTS, UNITED STATES AND SELECTED REGIONS,
BY UNIONIZATION, OCTOBER 1945 (CONT’D)
NEW ENGLAND
Union Non-Union
Occupation and sex establishments establishments
Number Average Number Average
of
workers
hourly
rates
of
workers
hourly
rates
Men
Bed machine operators 904 #1.32 507 #1.30
Carpenters, maintenance 38 .89 14 .81
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, hand 174 1.10 83 1.13
Cutters, vamp and whole
shoe, machine 1,619 1.35 935 1.24
Cutters, outsole, machine 205 1.08 115 1.11
Edge setters 523 1.47 240 1.41
Edge trimmers, machine 584 1.55 397 1.55
Electricians, maintenance 28 .98 11 1.23
Fancy stitchers 38 1.29 29 .93
Floor boys 221 .64 53 .73
Goodyear stitchers 498 1.29 199 1.21
Heelers, leather, machine 214 1.33 115 1.24
Inspectors 138 .90 80 .81
Janitors 192 .56 117 .52
Machinists, maintenance 43 1.24 8 1.09
Maintenance men, general
utility 65 1.00 32 .87
McKay stitchers 66 1.23 91 1.25
Mechanics, maintenance 104 1.08 72 1,08
Pullers over, machine 500 1.44 280 1.30
Shoe cleaners 18 1,03 9 ---
Skivers, upper and lining,
machine 70 .98 43 .78
Sole attachers, cement 169 1.21 163 1.05
Stock clerks 98 .81 64 .80
Treers 892 1.34 468 1.23
Vampers 274 1.15 65 1.10
Watchmen 137 .58 92 .55
Wood heel attachers 149 1.17 80 1.14
Working foremen, processing
departments 104 1.22 78 1.02
Source: TJ.S. Department of Labor,
tics. Footwear 1945, p. 20
Bureau of Labor Statls-
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enced by the inducements of many cities and towns who were
anxious to locate industries within their boundaries. Some
of the inducements have been extreme--free factory sites,
tax rebates and even free labort (1)
Migration has stripped many of the shoe towns of
New England of their principal sources of employment, so
that few towns like Brockton (in which the bulk of the in-
dustrial working potential is employed in the shoe industry)
now exist. Competition from other industries, such as the
durable goods or textile industries have played little part
in enticing the workers since they do not offer much better
conditions than those in the shoe industry, (2)
B. Earnings
Although there are wide variations in earnings
from region to region and within regions, the Federal Re-
serve Bank reported in November, 1948 that: (3)
,,.,the overall average hourly earnings of
all plant workers in New England exceeded the
national average by 12 per cent but were lower
than earnings in the Middle Atlantic states.
For both men and women workers, earnings in New
England exceed the average for the country,
A comparison of earnings for individual
job classifications shows that New England was
1-
-Korace B, Davis. Shoes: The Workers and the Industry,
p. 27
2-
-Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p, 5
3-
Ibid
.• " • -
,
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
CHART 5 : AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS
of Plant Workers in Footwear Establishments by Regions
October 1945
KEY:
All workers
Men
w& Women
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Monthly Review, November 1948*
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CHART 6 : AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES AND HOURS IN THE SHOE INDUSTRY
Average Weekly Wage - Dollars Average Hours Per Week
Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

above the national average in almost every in-
stance. Moreover, according to a 1947 survey
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, shoe workers
in the Boston area receive higher rates than
comparable workers in all cities other than Los
Angeles and New York. Massachusetts workers
generally earn more per hour than comparable
workers in New Hampshire and Maine.
._
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VII. OTHER PROBLEMS
A. Competitive Position
1* Markets
The most important factor in the growth of the
New England shoe industry was its nearness to cheap water
transportation* Prom Boston shipments could reach any
coastal market; in fact, Boston was a well-established cen-
ter of trade and an important trans-shipping area by the
time any significant western migration took place in the
early nineteenth century* (1)
Because of its established position. New England
shoe producers could extend long credit terms directly to
the southern and western merchants* But by 1830 the expand-
ing interior cities no longer purchased directly from the
producers; merchandise was obtained through jobbers, who,
in turn, obtained their products from the Massachusetts
shoemakers* (2)
Style factors, however, disrupted New England’s
predominance as the shoemaking center of the country* New
tanning methods, and new developments in lasting enabled
thinner and more elegant uppers to be used in the manufac-
ture of shoes, particularly in women’s shoes* Quick-
1
—
Edgar M* Hoover, Jr* Location Theory and the Shoe and
Leather Industries, p. 173
2—
Ibid, p. 174
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changing styles made it difficult for the manufacturers to
reach the inland markets in sufficient time to keep pace
with demand, Mid-Western manufacturers located near their
sources of distribution could supply local demand better
than New England, Furthermore, New England had developed
so much in one direction of shoe manufacture -- for metro-
politan areas -- that it could not possibly hold the entire
market.
New England is made up largely of a group
of manufacturers making certain distinct or
special grades of shoes. Their product fits in
with the requirements of the merchants located
in the larger trading centers throughout the
country, or of the non-manufacturing general
line and specialty wholesaler, of the chain
store and mail-order houses. Our weak point is
in getting the product to the medium and small
trading centers at a reasonable and competitive
cost, (1)
Too, as the population constantly shifted west-
ward, the markets on the seaboard became unable to absorb
the heavy production of New England, New England itself
with only a small fraction of the nation’s population (6,4$)
could consume but 20$ of its total production. The Middle
Atlantic states with 20,4$ of the population was a strong
competitor and therefore was not a significant importer of
New England shoes, (2) This meant that New England had to
go farther and farther afield for markets, with a consequent
1
—
Boston Chamber of Commerce. The Shoe Manufacturing
Industry of New England, p, 12-13
2 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p, 3
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CHART 8 : NEW ENGLAND PRODUCTION BY PERCEfITAGES
^Figures previous to 1929 not available
Sources: National Shoe Manufacturers Association.
Facts and Figures on Footwear, p. 3, 7.
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Statistical
Supplement of November and December 1948,
Table I. attached to The Outlook for the
New England Shoe Industry.
Total
National
Production
in
Thousands
*.
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diminishing demand for its products.
Although New England had managed to keep a some-
what stable position in the distribution of shoe products
from 1925 to 1946, nonetheless, its disadvantageous geo-
graphical location--affecting its ability to reach distant
shoe markets—has limited distribution to the point where a
downward trend is indicated over the coming years. (1)
2 • Machine Leasing
Before the Civil War the ordinary shoe manufac-
turer made little capital contribution for his machinery and
tools. Changes in methods of manufacture had come along, to
be sure, but they weren’t of such a nature that the manu-
facturer was forced out of operation. But Colonel McKay’
s
stitcher created an enormous change in manufacturing proce-
dures. His complicated machine effected huge savings in
labor, so much so that those who adopted the sewer had a
competitive advantage over other manufacturers.
Because small producers could not afford the ini-
tial outlay for the machine and because McKay had to have
wide distribution in order to make any profits, he decided
to lease his equipment. McKay also serviced the machinery
and supplied spare parts. When Goodyear entered the field,
the leasing system was so well established that he, too,
had to adopt it. To avoid duplication of equipment and cut-
1
— Ibid, p. 3
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throat competition the United Shoe Machinery Corporation
was formed in 1899 from the McEay shoe Machinery Corpora-
tion, the Consolidated and McKay Lasting Machine and the
Goodyear Sewing Machine Company.
Through the system of leasing there are no geo-
graphical differences in installation costs; costs are the
same for a Boston shoemaking firm, a few miles away from the
main plant of United, as a California company. If such cost
differentials were allowed to exist by United, there is
every reason to believe that they "would have been in favor
of districts of concentrated production, since there the
actual costs of installation, servicing, and so on, are at
a minimum." (1) Obviously, New England was unable to main-
tain its early lead in low machinery costs and skilled labor
since the leasing system tended to disperse the industry.
( 2 )
Moreover, since royalty payments are the same for
the small as for the larger manufacturers, the economy of
large-scale operations cannot be realized. Because capital
requirements for machinery are so low, many small- si zed
manufacturers have been encouraged to enter the industry
—
with an attendant overdevelopment and overproduction.
Standardization of machinery also eliminates any
competitive advantage obtained through new processes, other
1
—
Edgar M. Hoover, Jr. Location Theory and the Shoe and
Leather Industries, p. 173
2 Ibid, p. 203
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than a short-run advantage, since the process will inevita-
bly spread throughout the industry* (1) Any competitive ad
vantage derives from location and managerial skill* (2)
B* The Size of New England Firms
It is comparatively easy to enter the shoe indus-
try. Financial requirements are small. Only a moderate
deposit is necessary to rent the needed machines and equip-
ment. Rental charges are paid on an output basis, thus
eliminating depreciation, obsolescence charges and reducing
idle plant costs. Labor costs vary with the fluctuations in
demand. ”Piece-work wage rates, coupled with machinery
rentals based on actual production, help to maintain profit
margins both in good times and bad, and offset to some ex-
tent the adverse effects of fluctuating raw materials
prices. 11 (3) Thus small marginal manufacturers who contri-
bute to the excessive amount of failures each year can enter
the field. Furthermore, it is among these small companies
that the bulk of New England production is spread*
Of the entire national production it is signifi
cant to note that five large firms--the International Shoe
Company, the Endicott- Johnson Company, the Brown Shoe
1—
-Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 5
2—
Ibid
3
—
Standard & Poor. Industry Survey, Leather & Shoes Basic
Analysis, March 12, 1948, p* 4
.*
-
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Company, the General Shoe Company and the Melville Shoe
Company, none of which are New England firms
—
produce 30%
of the national output. (1) The remainder of production
is scattered among 1095 smaller companies*
Because the larger concerns have been able to sell
directly through their own retail units or have well-estab-
lished connections with independents, mail order houses,
chain stores and department stores, they have, in conse-
quence, improved their positions in the industry* (2) The
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston says:
For example, four of the largest shoe pro-
ducers showed an average increase of 10*6 per
cent in output from 1946 to 1947, while the rest
of the industry combined (including the other
large firms) showed a decline of 16*1 per cent
in output. The drop was far greater for most of
the small producers.
The larger companies have also attempted to sta-
bilize their output by producing staple lines and by decen-
tralizing their plants. This has forced the new manufac-
turers to seek their outlets in the high style fields. where
failure is the greatest. This has been the pattern of com-
petition in New England: (3)
The average New England shoe manufacturer is
smaller than the typical shoe producer in the
United States as a whole. Even though the New
Hampshire and Maine companies are above average
in size, the much lower Massachusetts average
dominates the regional figures ... .The shoe
1—
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Industry, November, 1948, p. 3
2—
Ibid
3
—
Ibid, p. 4
O’ • 0
.
-
'
-
*’
.
.
*
•
*
*
4
—
,
s.
90
TABLE X: SUCCESS IN USE OF SALES CHANNELS, BY CLASS OF
SHOE -- 1947
Sales Channel Men’s Shoes
Sales Change,
Through 1946 to
Channel, 1947 1947
Affiliated retail stores 44% plus 9%
Independent retailers 36 minus 2
Wholesalers and jobbers 10 minus 23
Mail Order houses 4 minus 20
Chain stores 3 plus 34
All others 3 plus 4
Sales Channel Women’
s
Shoes
Sales Change,
Through 1946 to
Channel, 1947 1947
Affiliated retail stores 5% plus 38%
Independent retailers 14 minus 15
Wholesalers and jobbers 28 minus 29
Mail order houses 4 minus 41
Chain stores 49 minus 16
All others .... —
Sales Channel Misses’ and Children’s Shoes
Sales Change,
Through 1946 to
Channel, 1947 1947
Affiliated retail stores mm *-*
Independent retailers 59 plus 25%
Wholesalers and jobbers 31 minus 13
Mail order houses — —
Chain stores 10 plus 1
All others — —
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, The Outlook for
the New England Shoe Industry, November 1948, p. 9
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•
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industry in this area is overbalanced with small
producers*
This situation was probably a factor in New
England’ s lower share of shoe production after
1946* It could easily contribute to future
shifts in the same direction for both New England
and the Middle Atlantic states, whose shoe com-
panies are also smaller than the national average*
C • Distribution and Output
Because so many of the firms located in New Eng-
land are either closely controlled corporations or small
businessess without adequate records, it is difficult to
make any suppositions as to methods of marketing. (1)
However, a study of 100 New England shoe compan-
ies by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in cooperation
with the New England Shoe and Leather Association revealed
the following facts:- (2)
1. Only the bigger manufacturers maintained output
from 1946 to 1947 better than the small firms*
a. In men’s shoes, the larger firms increased
output 7$, compared to a drop of 24$ for
other firms*
b. Among women’ s shoe producers, the larger
firms suffered a combined loss in output of
27$; smaller companies’ losses were 41$ .
1-
-0ut of 16 New England companies queried, only one gave
the author full information. Five refused to give any,
one submitted a stockholders’ report and the others did
not answer. Out of seven queries sent to national con-
cerns, five gave full information, one sent a stock-
holders’ report and one did not answer.
2
—
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 7-8
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NEW ENGLAND SHOE PRODUCTION FOR STOCK AND TO ORDER
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CHART 10
HOW BRANDING PRACTICES AFFECTED SHOE PRODUCTION
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2. Companies specializing in medium-priced shoes
showed the greatest stability of any New
England group since January 1946.
3. Most companies distributed their products over
a national area: 17% sold in New England, 28%
in the Middle Atlantic states, 32% in the
Middle West and Great Lakes states, and 23%
throughout the rest of the nation.
4. Factory-branded shoes had the greatest stabil-
ity in output, whereas buyer-branded or non-
branded shoes fluctuated in volume.
a. Factory brands predominated in the men’
s
shoes while buyers brands were more
evident in women’s shoes.
b. Factory brands were used for stock shoes
and in all classes were more stable than
shoes produced for customers’ orders.
5. Outlets — Twenty-seven per cent of 1947 shoe
production (of the companies sampled) sold to
chain stores, 26% to independents, 21% to
company owned retail outlets, 17% to whole-
salers and jobbers and 9% to other buyers.
a. Chain store selling seems to be a success-
ful outlet for the sale of men’s shoes.
b. Affiliated retail stores were the most
successful outlets for women’s shoes.
c. Misses’ and children’ s shoes were most
successful in sales to independent
retailers.
6. Companies in the women’s and men’s shoe fields
which advertised nationally and locally did
not enjoy any particular advantage over those
which did not.
a. Sixty-four per cent of the firms did no
advertising nationally or locally.
b. Most of the firms which did advertise,
advertised in national periodicals. In
misses’ and children’ s shoes advertising
increased production.
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D. Management
The immeasurable factor that has enabled New
England to keep its foothold in the industry— in spite of
distance from the national market and the disadvantage of
small size, and in spite of the inability to profit from
machine or processing developments—has been management.
Many of the men who are officers of one New
England shoe company are officers in others as well. Many
of these executives are steeped in the skill and tradition
of shoemaking. For example, in 1924 the Daly Brothers Shoe
Company, which was one of New England’s older plants, became
part of the Spencer Corporation. The Daly Brothers, John J.
and Charles I., managed to obtain control of both Spencer
and Daly Brothers. John also became the controlling stock-
holder and chairman of the Regal Shoe Company, another large
corporation. Another example is the George E. Keith Company,
makers of the famous ’’Walk-Over” shoes. Harold and J. R.
Keith, sons of the founder, direct this corporation. In
addition, Harold is a director of the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation.
’’....many of New England’s small shoe fac-
tories are run by individuals who have rich
backgrounds in shoe production and merchandis-
ing, who are keen in discerning trends, and who
are sensitive to the convolutions of the market.
The net effect of these influences is largely
buried in the effects of the many other fac-
tors which affect the position of the industry.
Nevertheless, it appears that the keenness and
..
.
.
.
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aggressiveness of New England’ s shoe producers
has offset any managerial disadvantages attri-
butable to less than average size and has pro-
vided an appreciable though intangible support
to the region’s relative position in the induS'
try. (1)
1--Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 4
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VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Summary of Trends
1. The Highlights
A. New England is making smaller and smaller
contributions to national production.
B. The small size of New England shoe producers
is a disadvantage in the face of large-scale
integration and diversification by the bigger
companies
.
C. The New England industry is in Stage VI,
while the national industry is in Stage V.
Downswings in the business cycle will be
greater than any upswing. That is, in any
recession or depression New England will lose
more ground in national production than it
will gain in any prosperous period.
D. Growth of other shoe-producing states will be
at the expense of established areas, particu-
larly New England.
1. Even within New England there is a shift
—
Massachusetts is losing ground to both
Maine and New Hampshire.
2. New England itself cannot absorb the entire
regional production.
E. However, New England will probably continue to
produce about the same percentage of the na-
tional production for the next few years. In
1948, upto June, production figures were off
1947 figures for the same period by only , 4%.
( 1 )
1. The outlook for the shoe industry is good
since per capita consumption of shoes re-
mains relatively stable and production for
1--Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Statistical Supplement,
Monthly Review, November and December, 1948.
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1949 is estimated at a high figure of450.000.
000 pairs. (1)
2. New England should produce about150.000.
000 pairs. (2)
F. The industry, though the fourth largest em-
ployer in the New England area, is not an im-
portant element in New England economy. The
low rate of increase in shoe consumption, the
decline in national output and the consequent
decline in employment needs for the industry
have contributed to a smaller participation in
the New England economy. (3)
2. A Structural Comparison of Five Selected Companies
Since there are no available data on many of the
New England concerns, a representative selection of some of
the larger and more well-known companies in comparison to
national leaders will demonstrate the feasibility of buying,
selling or holding securities of local shoe companies.
Though this sampling is not indicative of the New England
industry as a whole, it is indicative of the relative
strength and position of the stronger regional companies;
whatever findings hold true for the selected companies will
hold true on a lesser scale for the others.
The three New England companies selected are the
W.L. Douglas Company, the George E. Keith Company (Walk-Over),
and the Regal Sho e Company. These three companies combined
1
-
Irving R. Glass, executive vice-president of the Tanners’
Council of America. Boston Traveler, February 9, 1949
2-
-Maxwell Field, executive vice-president. New England Shoe
and Leather Association. Boston Herald, January 30, 1949
3-
-Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Outlook for the New
England Shoe Industry, November, 1948, p. 8
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contributed seven per cent of New England* s total sales for
the year 1947, and are nationally known companies. All have
their own retail outlets and all produce men* s and women* s
shoes as their main products.
The two national companies selected for comparison
are the International Shoe Company, the largest shoe manu-
facturer in the United States, and the Brown Shoe Company,
the third largest shoe manufacturer in this country. Both
companies have their headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri.
Without doubt International Shoe Company is the
leader in net sales. The chart Net Sales for Five Selected
Companies indicates that International is also subject to
the extreme fluctuations of the business cycle. Although
the three New England companies do not command a large part
of national sales, nonetheless, they are less subject to
sharp peaks and troughs. This stability in volume of busi-
ness is advantageous only in periods of depression; in
periods of prosperity it would indicate an inability to
raise the volume of sales.
Although none of the shoe companies is subject to
machinery depreciation, there is, however, a depreciation
factor for the other phases of business operation. Inter-
national’s depreciation figures vary over the years, indi-
cating the possibility of manipulation of the operating
expense account. A comparison with physical property bought
and sold over this period would be necessary to determine
*•
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CHART 11
NET SALES FOR FIVE SELECTED COMPANIES
International Shoe Company
—~ Brown Shoe Company
George E. Keith Company
W.L. Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoe Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948*
Company Reports, 1948.
.
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International Shoe Company
Brown Shoe Company
George E. Keith Company
W.L. Douglas Company — Not Reported
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoe Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948.
Company Reports, 1948.
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manipulation. Brown Shoe Company was more stable from 1929
to 1948, while the George E, Keith Company varied somewhat.
Figures for the other two New England companies were unavail-
able ,
The chart for "Net Income Before Taxes” is impor-
tant for discerning the actual earning powers of the various
companies. Again International is the leader with Brown
showing great strength. The New England companies are
closely bunched, but far below the other two in dollar earn-
ings. It is interesting to note that the Keith company
made a strong recovery in earnings since 1940, so that of the
three regional concerns, it is the biggest revenue producer.
Net income after taxes and reserves reveals some-
what the same picture as net income before taxes. Interna-
tional's net income remained relatively steady from 1939 to
1946, while Brown showed a little more fluctuation during
these years. Douglas and Keith suffered heavily during 1937
and 1938 with Douglas recovering more quickly than Keith.
In 1948, however, Douglas operated at a deficit. Regal’s net
income fluctuated less than any of the other four companies,
showing the best return for 1948 of any of the New England
firms.
All three New England companies have little dif-
ferences in their total assets; Walk-Over is the largest.
In comparison to the colossi. International and Brown, the
New England concerns are minor competitors.
..
.
.
.
103
CHART 13
NET INCOME BEFORE TAXES FOR FIVE SELECTED COMPANIES
_ International Shoe Company
Brown Shoe Company
— George E* Keith Company
W.L* Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948,
Company Reports, 1948,
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International Shoe Company
Brown Shoe Company
George E* Keith Company
W.L* Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor's Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948*
Company Reports*
'-
„
.
*
*
.
.
»
- -
.
105
CHART 15: TOTAL ASSETS FOR FIVE SELECTED COMPANIE
(In Millions) 1929-1948
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International Shoe Company
Brovm Shoe Company
George E. Keith Company
W.L. Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948,
Company Reports, 1948.
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The possession of cash means very little; it is
only when compared with liabilities that it has any signifi-
cance, The chart "Cash Items” does show, however, stability
on the part of four of the companies; again, it would be
necessary to obtain a percentage of cash in relation to
other current assets in order to determine whether the com-
panies were increasing or decreasing their cash reserves.
The "Cash to Liability Ratio,” on the other hand,
is very revealing. It shows great fluctuations in all the
companies. There is little consistency in each curve other
than in periods of greater sales, cash reserves dwindle, and
inventories rise. Regal, however, has shown a contrary
trend in 1941--its inventories remained steady, its sales
rose somewhat, but its cash position in relation to its cur-
rent liabilities soared out of proportion with any other
year. Evidently the management wished to keep extreme liqui-
dity for that year in the face of a declining income. The
George E. Keith Company, the Brown Shoe Company and the
W.L. Douglas Company restored their liquidity in 1948 and
leveled off their inventory purchases; whereas. Interna-
tional maintained a huge Inventory to meet its increasing
sales.
In the matter of receivables, almost all of the
companies have shown a conservative approach toward increas-
ing the amount carried on their books, with the exception of
International. In fact, this item and the increase in inven-
,V , r.
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CHART 16:
(In Millions)
CASH ITEMS FOR FIVE SELECTED COMPANIES
1929-1948
International Shoe Company
—— Brown Shoe Company
George E* Keith Company
W.L* Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948*
Company Reports, 1948*
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— Brown Shoe Company
George E* Keith Company
W*L* Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948.
Company Reports, 1948
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Brown Shoe Company
George E. Keith Company
W.L. Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948*
Company Reports, 1948.
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CHART 19: RECEIVABLES FOR FIVE SELECTED COMPANIES
(In Millions) 1929-1948
International Shoe Company
_—— ..... Brown Shoe Company
George E. Keith Company
W#L. Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948,
Company Reports, 1948*
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tory purchases probably account for International^ down-
ward trend in cash items.
The three New England companies show little abil-
ity to increase their current assets. (This, as previously
noted, holds true for total assets.) In any case, this
might be a reflection on management- -it cannot provide ex-
pansion with rising profits in the industry as a whole*
Current liabilities alone, like cash items, are
not significant. International, for instance, has increased
its liabilities, but, at the same time, has increased cur-
rent assets with the result that its net working capital has
not been impaired. On the other hand, the Brown Company had
decreased its liabilities and increased its net working
capital. Douglas, Keith and Regal have managed to improve
their working capital somewhat upto 1946, though Keith and
Douglas have shown a decline for 1948. All companies have
good current ratios--Internati onal and Brown are well above
the 3.78 upper quartile recommended for shoe manufacturers;
and Douglas, Regal and Keith are well above the lower quar-
tile of 1.87. (1)
Summary: The bigger companies- -International and
Brown- -have increased the dollar volume of sales and their
net income considerably, v/hereas, the New England companies
have been able to increase but little their position in the
l--Roy A. Foulke . Security Exchanges in World Finance,
1947, p. 52
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— International Shoe Company
Brown Shoe Company
George E* Keith Company
W.L. Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948,
Company Reports, 1948,
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Brown Shoe Company
George E. Keith Company
W.L. Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor* s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948.
Company Reports, 1948.
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—
. International Shoe Company
—- Brown Shoe Company
George E* Keith Company
W.L* Douglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948*
Company Reports, 1948*
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CHART 23: NET WORKING CAPITAL FOR FIVE SELECTED COMPANIES
(In Millions) 1929-1948
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International Shoe Company
Brown Shoe Company
George E. Keith Company
W.L* %uglas Company
Regal Shoe Company
Source: Standard & Poor’s Industry Survey, Leather &
Shoes, Basic Analysis, March 12, 1948*
Company Reports, 1948.
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market. As a matter of fact, from 1947 to 1948 they have
registered declines in income from the 1946 high, declines
which, in proportion, are greater than those of the larger
companies. This has also been true of total assets. Al-
though the two larger companies--Intemational and Brown
—
have managed to strengthen themselves, none of the New
England concerns has made any great progress in increasing
its trading position. Regal' s, in fact, has shown a defi-
nite retrenchment.
B, Summary of Securities
1, The Preferred Stocks
The qualifications of a high grade preferred stock
should be such that it is as safe as a good bond. In fact,
this margin of safety should be large enough so that a div-
idend becomes a matter of course. Too, the industry must
be stable enough so that variations in the business cycle
will not cause a suspension of payments even if earnings
are ample. (1)
Preferred stocks should meet the following re-
quirements: (2)
A. The preferred stock of the company (companies)
should not exceed 33%> of all securities out-
standing.
1
—
Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. Security Analysis,
p. 190
2-
-David F. Jordan. Investments, p. 406
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1* Regal has no preferred stock*
2. W.L. Douglas and George E. Keith compan-
ies have preferred stock, the total of
which composes more than 50% of all
securities outstanding*
B* The average total income for the five pre-
ceding years available for the payment of
interest and dividends should be at least
2i times the average preferred dividend re-
quirement plus the average bond interest, if
any bonds are outstanding.
1* Regal has no bonds outstanding,
2. Neither Douglas or Keith have bonds out-
standing, but their average income for a
four year period fall below the 2-g- times
requirement*
a* Douglas’ 1% cumulative preferred, par
$100 has been in arrears since 1947*
Arrearage is now $117.25 per share.
On its $1 cumulative convertible prior
preferred, no par, it paid a dividend
of $.20 in 1938, none from 1939 to
1942, $1.00 from 1943 to 1945, $2.00
in 1946, $1.00 in 1947, and $.50 as
of March 1, 1948.
b. Keith’ s $5 cumulative prior preferred,
par $100 and $2 non- cumulative junior
prior preferred, par $10 have had
regular quarterly payments, though the
7% cumulative first preferred, par
$100, has not had a payment since 1938
and is now in arrears up to $101.75
per share.
C. The issues should preferably be noncallable
and listed on a National Securities Exchange.
1. Douglas convertible prior preferred is
callable and is not listed on any ex-
change •
2. All of Keith’s preferred stock is callable,
and none is listed on any national ex-
change.
D. The issue should preferably be one of a com-
..
.
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pany which has no funded debt.
1. Regal’s has no funded debt.
2. Keith and Douglas have no funded debt.
E. The company (companies) should be in a growing
industry, supplying an essential product or
service, fairly well integrated and not pri-
marily interested in export sales.
1. Unfortunately the New England shoe indus-
try is in a declining stage, having long
ago passed its peak.
2. The industry as a whole is not growing.
The New England companies are not too well
integrated and do little exporting.
Summation: The preferred stocks of the George E.
Keith and the W.L. Douglas shoe companies make poor invest-
ments. They do not, by any stretch of the imagination, war-
rant holding or buying. Now that these two companies have
declined in earning power from their peak year of 1946, any
returns on the stock will be sporadic and subject to the
fluctuations of the business cycle.
2. The Common Stocks
The qualifications of a common stock is its future
earnings. (1) Common stocks should meet the following
tests: (2)
A. The common stock should have an unbroken divi-
dend record for the preceding ten years.
1, Neither George E. Keith Company or W.L.
_
1-
~Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. Security Analysis,
p. 552
2-
-David F. Jordan. Investments, p. 406
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Douglas Company have paid any dividends on
their common stock.
2. The Regal Shoe Company paid $.58 per share
in 1946, $.30 in 1947 and as of October 15,
1948, $.50.
B. The market price should not be more than
twenty times the average earnings per share
for the preceding five years.
1. The average earnings per share for the
Douglas company is $1.60. In 1948 its
common sold for a high of $5.25--hardly
twenty times the average earnings per
share.
2. For the Regal company average earnings per
share were $4.26. In 1948 It sold for
$5.38--a very low figure.
3. Figures for the George E. Keith Company
were unavailable.
C. The prevailing dividend rate should afford a
return on the cost price of not less than 3%
per annum.
1. All three companies do not provide a sub-
stantial dividend, if they provide one at
all.
2. The common stock of the Keith company is
held for control—25 stockholders control
20,248 shares or almost one-half the vot-
ing rights.
D. The issue should be listed on a National Securi-
ties Exchange.
1. Douglas and Keith are not listed with any
national exchange.
2. The regal common stock, however, is listed
on the New York Curb Exchange.
E. The issue should preferably be one of a com-
pany which has no funded debt.
1. Regal’s has no funded debt.
2. Keith and Douglas have no funded debt.
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p. The company should be in a growing industry,
supplying an essential product or service,
fairly well-integrated, and not primarily
interested in export sales.
1. The companies are not too well-integrated.
2. They do supply an essential product or
service, and do not depend on exports.
But they are not in a growing industry.
In fact, they represent a segment of an
industry which is matured and is subject
to business fluctuations.
Summation: The poor dividend returns, and the out-
look for future earnings make the common stock a poor in-
vestment. Now that the peak of deferred demand, brought
about by the war, has passed and consumer resistance to high
prices has stiffened, the three companies will be in no posi-
tion to give anything but the most meager of returns, if any,
during the coming years. The situation is such that New
England shoe companies must develop other lines of produc-
tion such as misses' and children's shoes, if they are not
to lose further ground to the bigger and better- integrated
companies.
Any consideration of past history in the matter of
dividend returns is strong evidence that only in the best of
years, when other companies were paying very profitable re-
turns on common stock, did the New England shoe companies
pay any returns at all. There is no evidence to show that
this will not be the policy in the future--even though earn-
ings might warrant payment.
**
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